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ABSTRACT
Closed form approximations for the probability of damaging sur­
face targets with aerially delivered weapons are developed and ana­
lyzed for six different employment situations; single weapons against 
point targets, single weapons against area targets, multiple weapons 
against area targets, single weapons against point targets with loca­
tion uncertainty, and multiple weapons against point targets with lo­
cation uncertainty.
In each case, conditional damage and probability of coverage 
functions are developed, the product of which defines the probability 
of damage or probability of fractional damage depending upon whether 
the target is a point or an area respectively.
In addition, optimum damage probability, or rather the maximized 
damage probability constrained by specific design characteristics 
and delivery errors, is developed and compared with the capabilities 
of current systems. Optimum pattern radii or, pattern radii which 
maximize the damage probability are also developed. Methodology which 
leads to preliminary design characteristics is developed through 
determination of the number of submunitions or weapon weight required 
to achieve any given level of damage for given employment constraints.
Weapon preference methodology is developed which establishes a 
parametric evaluation procedure for weapon system employment pre­
ference and preliminary design characteristics.
Analysis of nine representative weapons systems against three 
representative targets, where applicable, is presented to demonstrate 
the usefulness and adequacy of the methodology.
xi
The methodology developed In Ghapterell and III relatea specifically
to continuous patterns, that Is, to weapons Impact patterns bounded 
by singly connected curves and containing a random distribution of 
submunitions over the patterns. The methodology of the appendix 
extends the principles to weapons systems whose impact patterns are 
annular in nature, either circular or elliptic (within established 
limits) which are bound by multiply connected outer and inner curves.
For this application, the submunitions are constrained to lie within 
the annular ring or the area between the outer and inner curves.
The methodology is accurate and requires very little manpower 
and computer resources to employ. It is based on The Mean Area of 
Effectiveness (MAE) Concept and can be used to readily and accurately 
assess the potential of new designs and proposals if accurate estimates 
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING AND DESIGNING
AIR ARMAMENT
A. Introductory Remarks
The purpose of this investigation is to develop closed form 
approximations for the conditional damage and the probability of 
coverage functions, products of which yield weapon system probability 
of damage functions. Several weapons systems and employment situa­
tions are investigated. Closed form solutions in terms of the various 
weapon, target and employment parameters, can be used both as a rapid 
means of accurately assessing the effectiveness of weapons systems 
and as a preliminary design tool for determining weapon systems de­
sign characteristics.
At present, the assessment of weapon system damage probability 
is accomplished by numerical Integration techniques which are time
consuming and require large expenditures of manpower and computer 
12 3resources ’ . Duncan suggested the use of the Poisson distribution 
as a means of approximating the hit probability of at least one missile 
from a random circular salvo of missiles. Although narrow in scope, 
it was this initial work which prompted the modifications and ex­
panded applications herein. Utilization of the Poisson distribution 
for approximating the conditional damage function appears in reference
4. However, the probability of coverage function appears in functional 
form such that the probability of damage must still be computed nu­
merically or found parametrically. Gould, Arnold and Von Waldburg^
1,2 Superscripts are used to denote references
2
extended this technique, with the Inclusion of the Rayleigh distribu­
tion as an approximation of coverage function, to point targets. 
However, efforts to date have failed to produce sufficiently accurate 
and general closed form approximations of both the conditional damage 
and probability of coverage functions to serve as useful assessment and 
design tools.
The problem of planning and designing air armament is extremely 
complex, involving a chain of decision junctions many branches of 
which can lead to erroneous conclusions. Preliminary design is an 
essential element of air armament and development planning, the deci­
sion making process of weapon system selection. An important but 
often neglected consideration in the decision making process is whether 
one system is adequate or whether more than one system is required to 
maintain a realistic conventional munitions inventory capable of neg­
ating existing and anticipated threats. A basic question is whether 
the members of a family of weapon systems complement one another suf­
ficiently to justify the additional expenditure that multiple systems 
imply.^
When several measures of effectiveness that are basically dif­
ferent may all be important for any given set of circumstances, serious 
consideration should be given to more than one system. In addition, 
if the expected employment environments are quite different, due 
either to future uncertainty or enemy counteraction, more than one 
system could yield the flexibility of action that is essential to 
perform at any reasonable level of competence. A single rigid weapon 
system Invites enemy change which may negate the value of an otherwise 
effective system.^
3
Very often "analysis" situations lead to the adoption of weapon 
systems which will never be called upon to operate in an average en­
vironment with respect to an average measure of effectiveness. These 
highly specialized weapon systems are expensive luxuries and can find 
justification only after a basic core of effective and highly flexible 
general purpose systems have become a reality. The development and 
maintenance of large numbers of highly specialized single purpose sys­
tems is prohibitively costly for the amount of anticipated return.
The development engineer is often too close to his programs to 
render rational and bias free assessments pertaining to current needs 
and future potential. As a consequence, it is essential that a periodic 
review of extant exploratory, advanced and engineering development pro­
grams be made by research and development management to ascertain the 
viability and currency of the existing programs with existing and an­
ticipated levels of threat and tactical operational environments.
Until a few years ago, research and development of conventional 
munitions within the Air Force relied almost totally on the experience 
and judgment of development engineers. Although the basic analytical 
tools for weapons effectiveness analysis had been in existence for 
many years, they were used primarily as a means of assessing the ef­
fectiveness of the munition after it had been developed, tested and 
placed into inventory.^ Much of this was due to the fact that the 
necessary a priori inputs to a system analysis were scanty, unreliable 
and in many cases nonexistant. Very few development programs were 
actually justified based on predicted performance or anticipated pay­
off other than the "feelings" of development engineers.
4
More recent emphasis on pre-development analysis, promoted mainly 
by a tightening research and development budget and an ever expanding 
weapons systems inventory, has led to the establishment o£ more com­
prehensive physical testing and of a broad weapon effectiveness data 
bank. As a result, sufficient target vulnerability, weapons character­
istics and weapons effects data have evolved which permit sound pre­
development elimination of poor designs or retention of the most pro­
mising programs.^
Current analytic efforts are extremely complex and weapon system 
analysis requires an expenditure of manpower comparable to that of 
the actual research and development of the weapon system. Current 
efforts Involve extreme amounts of available computer resources. It 
is the nature of existing brute force techniques that discrimination
between poor design and promising design can be made only after ex-
1 2haustive computer studies. ’ In the final analysis the choice is 
still dependent upon the integrity of the analyst to ascertain the 
validity of the input data, the viability of the employment constraints 
utilized in the analysis, and the interpretation of the study results.
A major deficiency with current analytical efforts is the fact 
that poor systems are subjected to the same detailed scrutiny as the 
promising systems since discrimination can be made only in the final 
analysis. Analyses are conducted cautiously on all systems, promoted 
basically by a desire in the end to be able to discriminate between 
the promising systems and not between the two extremes. As a result, 
highly sophisticated system analysis techniques have been developed
in an attempt to converge to true solutions with relatively small
1,2 error. *
5
Such technique^ when applied to all proposed designs and concepts , 
result In a needless waste of resources. Techniques which are simple 
and require a minimum of manpower and computer resources are needed 
to reduce the ever increasing number of concepts and designs to the 
few which offer the greatest potential. The remaining programs can 
then be subjected to the detailed analysis necessary for establishing
a viable research and development program.
It is the purpose of this effort to develop methodology which 
approximates with sufficient accuracy the potential of proposed wea­
pons systems concepts and designs to the extent that the above can be
realized.
g
B. Pattern for Employment of Tactical Air Forces
The order of precedence in which combat air functions are accom­
plished cannot be prescribed by arbitrary methods and procedures. The 
fundamental principle governing the priority of combat air functions 
is the requirement to neutralize the enemy threat having the most pro­
found and continued influence on the total mission of the combat 
area command. This principle is compatible with the inherent charac­
teristics of tactical air forces, since it provides for their employ­
ment at a decisive time and place.
Tactical air forces are employed in the following tasks which 
produce area effects: the attainment of air superiority by destruc­
tion or neutralization of enemy air forces which threaten the area; 
the progressive neutralization of the enemy strength to sustain combat 
by Isolating air and surface combat forces from their means of supply
6
and battle sustenance; the disruption of enemy actions In the Immedi­
ate area of engagement between the opposing surface forces. The 
priority of these tasks Is dependent upon the effects desired In 
terms of the area command mission and war strategy.
Timely, offensive action against well-chosen targets is fundamen­
tal to the full exploitation of the combat potential of tactical air 
power. Timing of the action to destroy or neutralize a target may 
often be as important as the selection of the correct target.
The research and analysis of this effort will be restricted to 
tactical surface targets, specifically to the preliminary design and 
development planning methodology necessary to ascertain that a weapons 
system inventory is developed and maintained to meet all possible con­
tingencies within this mission area.
g
C. Target Vulnerability
The determination of target vulnerability involves an analysis 
of a number of complex factors. Premature commitment of forces with­
out proper consideration of target vulnerability may result in needless 
expenditure of effort and resources with little appreciable effect 
upon the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations.
A fundamental factor in considering target vulnerability is the 
essentiality of the target to the enemy's combat effort. The breadth 
of this factor lies in an examination of the entire spectrum of targets 
within an area of operations. Pursuant to this examination, the tar­
gets chosen should involve the most significant areas of enemy strength, 
without which his combat operations may need to be reduced drastically 
or suspended entirely.
7
In order to determine the susceptibility of targets to destruc­
tion or neutralization, detailed knowledge of their physical features, 
such as mobility, mass, construction, location, and density is required. 
The vulnerability of a target or target system must then be measured 
against existing weapons to produce varying degrees of effect depending 
upon the specific tactical operational environment. If voids or mar­
ginal capabilities exist, new weapons systems must be planned, designed 
and placed at the disposal of the tactical air forces. A detailed 
understanding of weapon capabilities, limitations, and effects is re­
quired in order to make the most efficient and economical selection. 
Targets may be vulnerable to attack, but impervious to the weapons 
available at the time required. Capabilities must be sufficient to 
insure that the effects produced are commensurate with the effort 
and resources expended.
D. Concepts From Weapons Systems Analysis
1. Damage and Casualty Criteria^
Because of the complexity of tactical air operations against 
surface targets, the changing nature of order of priority from one 
battle area to another, logistics, and a nonlinear depletion of avail­
able local munitions stockpiles; it has been necessary to assess the 
effect of weapons systems at various levels below the ultimate of 
catastrophic target damage. Thus, a number of personnel incapacita­
tion criteria have evolved which relate weapon effectiveness at 
various levels below inducing death. They are separated into three 
main categories, with a time dependency within each category. The 
most stringent category is incapacitation to the extent that personnel
8
can no longer defend themselves from attack. The second category 
denies personnel the ability to assault, and the least stringent 
criterion denies the ability to function in a supply effort.
Effects on material targets are also assessed at levels of 
damage which are less than catastrophic. If a target possesses 
mobility, a group of time dependent criteria relating to immobiliza­
tion has evolved and, if a target possesses firepower, criteria 
have evolved which relate the potential of denying the target its 
firepower.
The interpretation of "kill” probabilities requires an under­
standing of some of the basic principles underlying weapon systems 
analysis. The term "kill" does not necessarily mean a kill in the 
literal sense. It is defined in terms of the desired degree of damage 
insofar as material targets are concerned and in terms of level of
incapacitation insofar as personnel targets are concerned. These
9criteria have physical and not statistical interpretations.
Each weapon has a certain probability of defeating any target 
(including the null probability) for any assigned damage or casualty 




























Vehicle Stoppage Within 2 Minutes
Vehicle Stoppage Within 20 Minutes




Immobilization Within 2 Minutes 
Control Loss Within 5 Minutes 
Mission Abort
Control Loss Within 5 Seconds 
Resulting in Eventual Catastroph­
ic Damage
Immediate Catastrophic Damage
Drop A Single Span
Cut A Single Rail
Ability to function in a defen­
sive posture denied within 30 
seconds
Ability to function in an assualt 
role denied within 5 minutes
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2. Mean Area of Effectiveness (MAE)^'^
The MAE concept relates the effectiveness of a weapon against a 
particular target, about the target centroid, in terms of the weapon's 
characteristics; target characteristics, both physical and vulnerable; 
and a specified damage or incapacitation criterion. It has been de­
veloped and is defined such that if the target is located within the 
mean area of effectiveness for a specified weapon and damage or incap­
acitation criterion, then the damage or Incapacitation criterion is at 
least satisfied.
This definition applies directly to point targets but may be ex­
tended to Include all targets whose centroids are located within the 
MAE. Certain targets having edge effects (unitary targets having 
large distributed areas such as buildings) and of a class where partial 
damage assessment has military significance must be approached in an 
entirely different manner. The reader is referred to reference 9 for 
further explanation.
The problem of assessing weapon system effectiveness is essentially 
reduced to determining the probability that a target will lie within 
the mean area of effectiveness subject to the constraints imposed 
by the weapon delivery system. The MAE concept may be modified, with­
out loss of generality, for multiple weapons delivery, as will be 
shown in later developments.
3. Delivery Accuracy
Delivery accuracy with regard to current capabilities is a mis­
nomer, since in the most basic sense, both the standard deviation 
(a) and circular probable error are measures of the pilot's inability
11
to place his weapon or weapon pattern center on a desired point on 
the ground. Combat and testing experience has shown that errors in 
range and deflection can usually be described by a normal (or a
9 10Gaussian) distribution whose precise characteristics are well known * 
The range error probable (REP) and deflection error probable (DEP) 
measure the tendency of the impact points to differ from the target 
center. When the REP and DEP are identical, the resulting distribu­
tion is called circular or radial. Circular distributions can further 
be described in terms of the circular probable error (CEP).^ When 
REP and DEP are not equal, the CEP concept may still be employed as, re­
lated in paragraph (E.3) of this chapter.
Delivery accuracy is normally divided into two categories, one 
being referred to as aiming error (â ) and the other as ballistic 
error (ff„). The aiming error is attributed basically to the pilotJ>
and his ability or inability to place the mean point of impact (MPI) 
of the weapon system on the target center. The magnitude of this 
error depends significantly on pilot experience and Initiative, the 
physical and defensive environment, and, the handling qualities of 
the aircraft. The ballistic errors are attributed to the weapon and 
are basically a measure of the divergence of impacts within a weapons 
pattern with respect to the MPI. The magnitude of the errors depends 
significantly upon the quality control in the weapons production and 
the ejection system.
Conversions for REP, DEP, CEP and o are given below. For ease 





To Convert From To Multiply By
CEP o' CEP 0.8493
CEP PE CEP 0.5729
o PE o 0.6745
o CEP ct 1.1774
PE cj PE 1.4826
PE CEP PE 1.7456
4. Damage Probability
In the most general sense, the probability of damage (P̂ ) is 
given by:*
00
pd " [fj p(x»y»z)f<x»y»z) dx dy dz 
-08
where,
p(x,y,z) is the kill probability of a warhead detonating at 
(x,y,z) and,
f(x,y,z) is the probability density function for the warhead 
detonating at (x,y,z).
A closed form solution to this function does not exist and it 
must be numerically integrated at discrete points in a manner so as 
to converge to the optimal parameter values as effic ently as possible.
An alternative expression for the damage function Is:
PD " PD/C ' PC
where Is the conditional damage given coverage and Is the pro­
bability of converage.^
Accurate closed form solutions for the damage probability are 
possible with this approach through utilization of the MAE concept 
and provided the conditional damage and probability of coverage func­
tions exist. It is this approach which will be followed throughout 
this investigation.
For area targets, the form of the probability of fractional 
damage Is the same and is given by:
FD " PD/C * FC
where PD/C is conditional damage given coverage and is the fraction 
of the target covered.
E. Concepts from Statistics
1. Poisson Distribution
The discrete probability distribution
Xk e_Xp(k) *» — —  ; k = 1,2,3,...; p(k) = 0 otherwise
is called the Poisson distribution after Poisson who developed it in
14
the early part of the 19th century. The dlatrlbutlon has the fol­
lowing properties:
Mean « \
Variance a2 ■ X
Standard Deviation
2. Blvarlate Normal Distribution**'*2
The two dimensional blvarlate normal population is the probability 
space induced by a pair of random variables (x,y) having a joint den­
sity function given by:
2
/x~K\ /x“̂ v\ /y-n,f(x,y) ± - —  exp {- - i y -  -2p
2ttct cr Vl-p  x y K
2
/y-K+ e ) ] >
Carrying out the required integration the marginal (Gaussian)
12density function f(x) of x is:
.x-M> 2
f(x) ■ 7 = r  “ p H b f ) ]J 2n a  x
1 x
and g(y) of y is:
2
i r. i /y-K
g(y) -
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Thus x and y are normally distributed random variables with
means u and u and. standard deviations and a .^y ux °y
The expectation
Is the constant p ,  the correlation coefficient of the random variables 
x and y (0 i p s 1). If the correlation coefficient has an absolute 
value of unity, the joint density function is meaningless, and the 
variables x and y are said to have a singular normal distribution, 
the entire probability mass being concentrated on a line. There is 
complete linear dependence between x and y for this case.
If p = 0, x and y are uncorrelated, hence independent, and the 
joint density function is a product of the marginal density functions.
the distribution is said to be circular normal.- For mean values




If in the blvarlate normal density function above a = o' -a,x y
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In terms of the vector deviations from the mean value, when 
only the magnitude of the radial error la significant, the density 
function is:*"̂
£(r) - ^  exp [- I (£) ]
This function is often referred to as the radial or Rayleigh density 
function. These distributions have the following properties: *"*■
a) Marginal Density Functions (Figure 1-2)
Standard Deviations CT ,x y
Probable Error in x .67449
Probable Error in y .67449 Q
y y
b) Joint Density Function ('? = ° ) (Figure 1-2)x y
Standard Deviation V
Circular Probable Error CEP = J  2 fa 2 cr
Circular Error Average CEA = J  "tt/2 cr
3. Equivalent Circular Probable Error
The circular probable error, as a parameter, is a unique function 
of the circular normal distribution. Although it is not associated 
with the non-circular (elliptic) blvarlate normal distribution, there 
is a circle centered at the aiming point of the non-circular distribu­
tion which contains half of the sample points. The radius of this 
circle is often referred to as equivalent circular probable error 
(ECEP) .10
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Radial distributions based on an elliptical normal distribution
(o i1 a ) must be integrated numerically for accurate results. How- x y
ever, when the smaller distribution is at least one-third of the
larger (.33 ^ a /a £ 3.0), good approximations can be obtained by a x y
straight line fit to the exact function:
ECEP = 0.615 c + 0.562 <r (O ^ a )y x ' y x7
ECEP = 0.615 o + 0.562 a <o ^ a )x y ' x y
Other common approximations used include: the geometric mean
J  cr̂  o^t which is accurate for very low values of cumulative probability
and is reasonably accurate up to a cumulative probability of 0.4; the
arithmetic mean !”̂ crx + CTy)/^] which is excellent at 0.6 and is often
used for intermediate values including the 50% point (CEP); and,
the root-mean-square a 8°°d approximation above
a cumulative probability of 0.751*. The best overall approximation is
the curve fit since the interval of accuracy extends over and beyond
the other three. These approximations in terms of the dimensionless









1.0 Root Mean Square
+ cr1.1774
Geometric Mean
1.1774 (crj r „ )
Arithmetic Mean 
1.1774 I v  -y
Exact
Straight Line Approximation 
fo .615 ct + 0.562 CT (a
0.615 a + 0.562 a
a  /a„  ; a„/cr.
Figure 1-1*^
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Figure 1-2
CIRCULAR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
(Drawn to Scale)
CHAPTER II
OPTIMUM DAMAGE PROBABILITY AGAINST POINT TARGETS
A. Singly Delivered Weapons Against a Point Target
1. The Probability of Coverage, Conditional Damage and Probability 
of Damage Functions for Area Weapons.
This section contains the development of the damage equations 
for an area weapon delivered against a point target. An area weapon 
is defined as a weapon system which contains a number (n) of submuni­
tions which are released in a salvo (simultaneously). In most cases, 
a cluster (packaged submunitions) is released as a unit and at some 
point along its trajectory dispenses the submunitions in a salvo.
A point target is defined as a single target containing one or more 
vulnerable components, any of which or any combination of which, satis­
fies the damage criterion if rendered inoperable.
a. The Probability of Coverage Function
The probability of coverage function P can be approximated 
by the radial distribution. It has been shown in reference 9, and is 
briefly discussed in the introduction, that the circular normal or 
radial distribution function is an excellent approximation of the 
elliptic normal distribution for .33 ^ Oyjay ^ 3.0. In these cases 
It is generally more appropriate to convert from standard deviation to 
circular probable error (CEP).
For the case of a point target (R̂  «  Rp) centered at (0,0), the 
probability that the target centroid will lie within the weapon's pattern 
radius Rp is the density function integrated over Rp. It can be assumed 
that the pilot can identify and is delivering weapons to the target
20
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center with standard deviation error <*. Thus the expected position 
of the munition's pattern center is the target centroid.
This is a special case of the probability of covering an area
target with an area munition with the area target radius degenerating
to zero. The development of the more general problem will be covered
in Chapter 3. The point target problem is separated from the general
problem primarily due to the higher frequency wtth which the former
appears in relation to the latter. Approximately 80% of all aerially
attacked surface targets can be classed as point targets.
Equation (2-2) is not necessarily restricted to point target
applications. As a matter of fact, it is an excellent approximation
for most area targets of Interest in tactical conventional and counter-
13insurgency warfare. For target radii to standard deviation ratios
on the interval (0 ^ Rrp/<j £ 0.5), Equation (2-2) accurately describes
13the circular coverage function over the entire range of 
Rp(0 ^ Rp/a £ “)• Restrictions on the latter interval increase the 
range of RpA*. For example, for RpA* ^ 3.0, the function is accurate 
over the interval (0 ^ R ^  1.5), for Rp/<j ^ 4.0, it is extended 
over the interval (0 ^ RpA* s 3.0), and for Rp/a ^ 5.0, it applies 






7Even for the best contemporary combat delivery accuracies, the 
ratios Rp/a and R w i l l  not normally exceed 5.0. However, the ad­
vent of Improved delivery accuracy necessitates an extension of the 
principles over larger intervals. As the standard deviation of error 
is improved, the range on R̂, must be reduced proportionately to main­
tain the specified intervals of R^/c* Developments in the next 
chapter will relate the extension over the interval (0 ^ R̂,/ct £ “) 
for all Rp(0 <: Rp/u <=).
b. The Conditional Damage Function
For weapons systems having a random uniform distribution 
of bomblets within the pattern area (Â ) bounded by a singly connected 
curve, the Poisson approximation adequately represents the conditional 
damage probability (Pjj/q) • The conditional damage probability is de­
fined as the average damage over the weapon pattern (Figpre 2-1).
Let
p(k successes) ■ exp (-p,) p, /k! (2-3)
where
p, - rlD MAEg/Aj - rlD R^/Rj,2 (R^ «  Rp
The mean value ^ is the ratio of the total area within which the damage 
criterion is satisfied to the total pattern area. The total area of 
effectiveness is the product of the number of bomblets with the system 
and the individual bomblet MAE. Therefore,
Figure 2-1
CONDITIONAL DAMAGE FOR A SINGLE AREA WEAPON
Pjjyc = 1 - p(0 Successes) - 1 - exp (-̂ ) p,°/01
or
?D/C ‘ t1 - eKp <-rl" "LB2/"?2)] (2-4)
c. The Probability of Damage Function
The product of Equations (2-1) and (2-3) leads to:
PD " [} _ 6Xp (-rln RLB2 R̂p2 ]̂ [} " 6Xp < " « p W > J (2-5)
2. The Probability of Damage Function for Unitary Weapons.
Unitary weapons are divided into two separate groups for class 
ification but can be treated identically in the development of the 
damage function. One class of unitary weapons is characterized by 
high-explosive/blast/fragmentation warheads for which the MAE concept 
is defined. Another class is comprised of kinetic energy and shaped- 
charge penetration warheads, for which the vulnerable area (Â ) con­
cept is defined. For unitary weapons characterized by the MAE con- 
cept, the conditional damage probability is unity. The MAE is defined 
in such a manner that, given the target centroid is located within the 
MAE, the damage criterion is satisfied, thus reducing the problem to 
coverage expectancy. The vulnerable area concept is defined such that, 
given an Impact within the vulnerable area, the damage criterion is sat 
isfied thereby reducing this problem to one of hit expectancy. Thus,
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the two concepts are equivalent. Since in the case of unitary warheads, 
MAE = Ap, the damage probability based on the Rayleigh distribution
becomes:
PD - [l - exp (-MAE/2tt a2)] (2-6)
and for the vulnerable area concept:
PD ~ [l - exp (-Av/2n <y2)] (2-7)
2 2 and since MAE = TtR̂  and Ay = TTRy ,
PD - [l - exp (-RL2/2ff2)] (2-8)
and
PD - [l - exp (-Ry H a  )] (2-9)
3. Maximization of the Damage Functions
The damage function in Equation (2-5) may be maximized to:
PD - [l - exp (-Rp2/2CT2)] (2-10)
simply by Increasing the number of bomblets within the weapon without 
bound, or both. None of these alternatives is economically feasible 
and even if such was the case, the limiting case (2-10) becomes
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analogous to the already limiting case for unitary weapons as reflected 
in Equations (2-8) and (2-9)- Within practical employment and economic 
constraints, the damage function may be maximized for a fixed munitions 
design concept by controlling pattern size as a function of the standard ' 
deviation of error (cr), the number of submunitions (n) and the MAÊ  
of the individual subraunitions. This approach is practical since pat­
tern size is a unique function of the aircraft weapon release parameters 
and weapon (fuze) function altitude. Thus, for a given standard devia­
tion or error, a fixed number of submunitionBeach having a mean area of 
effectiveness characterized by (R̂ g), fche damage function may be maxi­
mized by determining the optimum pattern radius for the above constraints. 
The optimum pattern radius may be achieved by specifying aircraft re­
lease parameters and a fuze function altitude (altitude at which the 
cluster releases the submunitions) which may be preset or electronically 
set from the cockpit.
As previously related, the damage function may be specified by:
PD " PD/C * PC
Operating on the damage function
%  »pc aPD/c
3RP ‘  pd/ c aRp + Pc sttp (2‘ u>
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Equating dPp/dRp to zero and solving for
Pc apc/aBp
PD/C 9PD/C/aRP
C _  *_ (2-12)
Then in terms of Equation (2-5),
9Pn ' r 2 21^  ^  exp [-Rp /2c ] (2-13)
" - ̂ 3 ^ -  - P  [ - 1- " l b V ]  <2‘14)
Substituting these relations and the expressions for and Pjj/q into 
(2-12) yields:
[l - exp (-H,,2^ 2)] Rp4 exp [-Rp2/2a2]
[l - exp (-rtn R ^ / R p 2] 2^ n  Rjj,2 a exp [.^n RLB2/Rp2]
(2-15)
Equation (2-15) is satisfied when:
S' - 2rin h*'”2 (2-16)
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The pattern radius which maximizes the damage function is:
1/4
“p - <2ri" \b2 °2> (2-17)
Substituting this expression into Equation (2-5) and simplifying, 
yields the damage function for the optimum pattern radius:
In many instances, it is desirable to determine the weapon system 
characteristics which will yield a desired level of damage (?q) f°r any 
given submunition type and standard deviation of error c. The number
The number of submunitions n (of a given type) completely speci­
fies the weight, volume, and physical characteristics of the weapon 
system required to yield the desired probability of damage for any 
given submunition design constrained by a standard deviation of error q-.
It is significant to note that the condition
0
(2-18)
of bomblets required to obtain a level of damage with standard devia­
tion of aiming error a can be determined from (2-18).
(2-19)
U 2 2V  - 2rln «LB «
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is equivalent to the following expressions:
2 2 
“p rlD R LB
2 s 2 
2 a Rp
This implies that the damage function is maximized when the conditional 
damage over the weapons pattern is equal to the probability of coverage
(PD/C " V *
4. Optimum Cluster Weapons Versus Optimum Unitary Weapons
a. Optimum Cluster in Terms of Circular Probable Error
The circular probable error can be expressed in terms of 
the standard deviation of aiming error:
CEP = J z  nn 2
or
= CEP/) 2^2'
substituting this expression into Equation (2-18)
PD = [l - exp (-R^j y  rxn 2/cEP)] (2-20)
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or, in terms of CEP
2 rln ^LR tot ̂CEP « — --— ----- 5- (2-21)
(1 -/V]
b. Circular Probable Error in Terms of weapon Weight
It is desirable to compare the effectiveness of cluster wea­
pons and unitary weapons on an equal weight basis or cost/weight basis 
since weapons weight is a primary penalty on aircraft performance in 
terms of acceleration, range and endurance. Cost may enter the pro­
blem since usually minimization of the penalty must be traded off against 
an increase in costs.
Define a constant such that:
= Total Cluster Weight ^ ^c 
1 = Total Bomblet Weight ° n
I  WBi 
i - 1
is the reciprocal of the packaging efficiency. Define a con­
stant K2 such that:
Then, the number of bomblets in the cluster can be expressed as: 
n
" ' I  WB1/WB 
i = 1
and the cluster weight as:
WC - (V 1 WBl)(WBi> - KlVu  1 * 1
or In terms of n,
Substituting this expression into Equation (2-21)
CEP2 - ■ rl H ° ^ 2 ^ 2----  (0 < P D < 1 )
* A  j >  <1 - / y ]
c. Optimum Unitary In Terms of Circular Probable Error
The expression for <y can be substituted into Equation (2 
yielding:
PD - [l - exp (- MAE 07J 2/TT CEP2)]





d. Circular Probable Error In Terms of Unitary Weapon
Weight
Examination of the behavior of MAE (Figure 2-2) as a
function of weapon weight for unitary weapons reveals a linear 
logarithmic-logarithmic relationship for constant (or nearly constant) 
charge mass to metal mass ratios (C/M). Of particular interest is 
the family of general purpose unitary weapons (C/M ̂  1.0) (Figure 2-2). 
The mean area of effectiveness may be expressed as:
Bn MAE ® Bn K + a Bn wu
where K is the MAE of the smallest weight being considered (equivalent 
to the MAE axis intercept), a is the slope of the line, and Wu is the 
weight of the unitary weapon being evaluated.
Alternatively,
a
MAE = K Wu
substituting this expression into Equation (2-24)
K W“ 0n 2 
tt Bn (1-PD)
i |0 < PD < l| (2-25)
e. Cluster Weight versus Unitary Weight







Motor Vehicle (Target 1)







_3Weapon Weight - LB x 10
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K W flan 2u
V z  [  *  <l  - / v ]
2 ” n to (1 - r j ; <0 < td < 15
This approach permits the development of a weight comparison when
both weapon systems are delivered with the same aiming error, or
equivalently, from identical delivery aircraft.
Solving for W_ in terms of W® c u
KjKjK 1
I" ri rlb
[*> <i - / v j
^  (i - v
Wj[ ; (0 < PD < 1) (2-26)
For any specified level of damage desired (P̂ ) and for equal 
weapon system weights (Wg = Wy) where the weapon systems designs are 
specified:
KjKjK -/v]
>; (0 < PD < 1)
and Equation (2-26) becomes
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or
W - p Wa - p
and finally,
0 < i - / v ] 2) (l-»'
; (0 < PD < 1) (2-27)
(1 “ PD)
By employing the relationship for weight in the above expression 
with either Equation (2-22) and (2-25) and parametric values of
the CEP-weight plane into distinct areas where either cluster 
weapons or unitary weapons are preferred. In addition, Equations 
(2-2 2) and (2-25) will yield a family of constant P^ curves (parallel
utilized both as a weapon effectiveness tool or as a parametric design 
tool.
B. Multiply Delivered Weapons Against a Point Target
1. The Probability of Coverage, Conditional Damage and Probability 
of Damage Functions for Multiply Delivered Area Weapons 
This section contains the development of the damage equations 
for multiply delivered area weapons against a point target. The de­
velopment is an excellent approximation for multiple cluster patterns 
which are circular (Figure 1-2) and does not diverge severely from the 
numerically integrated solution for rectangular weapons patterns in
PD (0 < PD < 1.0), weight and CEP; a curve is obtained which divides
2straight lines in the logarithmic CEP vs weight plane) which may be
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the interval (.33 ^ P„/PT ^ 3.0) where P is the pattern width andW Li W
PL is the pattern length. In this case, the pattern area is
a. The Probability of Coverage Function
The coverage function is identically the same form as de­
fined in paragraph (II-A-l-a). However, in this case it is desirable 
to determine the probability that the target lies within the multiple 
area weapons pattern of radius R̂ . The damage function will be de­
veloped later in terms of R̂ .
In a procedure identical to the approach in paragraph (II-A-l-a) 
the coverage function can be developed. It becomes:
b. The Conditional Damage Function
The product of the conditional damage within a single 
cluster pattern and the pattern area is defined as the mean area 
of effectiveness of the cluster (Figure 2-3).
approximated by tt Rp •
(2-28)
The mean value can then be determined 
* - - N Rp2 pd/c/rw2
t* - V nRpi2pD/C/nRM2 - NRp2pD/C/RW2 <Are8) 
i~= 1
m(x = Y = tbRl (Unitary)
i =̂ 1
PD/C = 1 " 6XP (_NRp2pD/C/RW2) (Area)
PD/C = 1 - exp (-mR^/H^2) (Unitary)
Figure 2-3
CONDITIONAL DAMAGE FOR MULTIPLY DELIVERED WEAPONS
38
It should be noted that the mean value In this sense Is not the 
same as would be derived for the case of the product Nn bomblets 
distributed uniformly over A^ determined by
H - ^ B 2 ^ 2
When area weapons are delivered multiply, n bomblets per pattern 
are constrained to lie In N pattern areas, the N patterns distributed 
randomly over Â . The two terms converge only for N coincident pat­
terns of radius = R̂ .
Therefore, the conditional damage for multiply delivered area 
weapons becomes:
P'd/C ■ [l - “ P <- NRp2 PD /c V > ] <2-29>
where is determined by Equation (2-17) and by Equation (2-4),
c. The Probability of Damage Function
The probability of damage Is determined by the product 
of Equations (2-28) and (2-29)
p'D = [l - exp (- NRp2 PD/C/ ^ 2)] [l - exp <-1^/2 <r2)] (2-30)
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2. The Probability of Coverage, Conditional Damage and Pro­
bability of Damage Functions for Multiply Delivered Unitary 
Weapons
The substitution of R^ for Rp and R^ for R^ in Equations 
(2-3), (2-4) and (2-5) yield respectively, the probability of coverage, 
conditional damage and probability of damage functions for m unitary 
weapons distributed uniformly and at random over an area delivered 
against a point target.
Pc' - [l - exp (- B^/2 a2)] (2-31)
PD/c' " [* ‘ “ P “ \ 2/BH2)] (2‘32>
«
PD " [} " 6xp m RL2^RW2^1 I”1 “ exP (’ (2-33)
where
H = m tt Rl2/tt r/  » m rJ / r/
is the mean value over the pattern
3. Maximization of the Damage Functions
a. Multiply Delivered Area Munitions
3 . p' Lis. _„ ■3 VcP ■ r-s*- + P. t— 5“  - 0
PRw ‘ D/CVH,, T r C a R
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?c _ _ 8 pc/8 ^
PD/C 8 PD/C/8 "» 
operation on Equations (2-28) and (2-29) results in:
[l - exp (-Rw 2 /2 o2)] (-Rw 2 /2 ®2)]
[l - exp (-NRp 2 PD/c/ \  >] 2NRp2 PD/(, ff2[exp(-BRp2 PD/CV ) ]
which is satisfied when 
2 2
«w - <2NRp PD/C ° > <2‘34)
the radius which maximizes the damage function.
Substitution of (2-34) into (2-30) yields the damage function for 
the optimum pattern radius
P; - [l - exp(-Rp PD/c/ y i T )]2 (2-35)
and
■ ■ (2/W[wV (1 ■ /v] <2-36)
is the number of clusters, with individual pattern radii and overall 
pattern radius R̂ , required to achieve a specified level of damage
V
PD when delivered with aiming error a .
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b. Multiply Delivered Unitary Weapons
Similar procedures applied to Equations (2-31), (2-32) 
and (2-33) yield:
The pattern which maximizes the damage function,
is the number of bombs necessary to achieve a level of damage PQ 
when distributed over and delivered with aiming error o.
4. Optimum Cluster Weapons vs Optimum Unitary Weapons for Multiple 
Weapons Against a Point Target
Converting c to CEP in Equations (2-35) and (2-38) and solving
Rjj - (2m Î 2 or2)
1/4
(2-37)








o m R_ Bn £ i
CEP - r  , . 12 l (0 < P < 1) (2-41)
[a. (i - /  v ] 2
In Equation (2-40) there are N clusters each having weight 
Wg ■ Kj^n as defined in paragraph (II-A-4-b).




CEP'2 WUT *L **2 ; (0 < Pp < 1) (2-42)
*0 [*• <l • /  v f
In Equation (2-41) there are m unitary weapons each having weight 
Wu. The total weight of the m unitary weapons is:
A3
Therefore,
; (0 < PD < 1) (2-43)
wu [*» - /v]
To compare the effectiveness of these two systems for equal air­
craft loadouts in terms of total weight of munitions expended and 
equal delivery accuracy, equate (2-42) to (2-43) and solve for
in terms of W „.uT
This relationship is independent of the damage probability as 
previously stated. It is assumed that both systems are delivered 
with the same accuracy. The following can be ascertained from Equa­
tion (2-44):
Clusters are preferred if:
(2-44)
< i ; (0 < pd/c * l) (2-45a)
Unitary weapons are preferred if:
> 1 ; (0 < Pp/Q £ 1) (2-45b)
where Pj^g is determined by Equation (2-4).
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C. Single Massive Clusters versus Multiply Delivered Small Clusters 
Many questions have arisen concerning the desirability of develop­
ing single massive clusters as opposed to large numbers of smaller 
clusters. These systems will be compared in the following paragraphs 
on an equal weight basis.
Let W„_ = Weight of the Massive Cluster MG
W _  = Weight of N Small Clusters Gx
The clusters are assumed to contain identical submunitions, the 
number in the massive cluster will be denoted as M and each small 
cluster will contain n bomblets.
The damage function for the massive cluster is:
PD » [l - exp (- r1 [l - exp (- °2>] (2-46)
and that of N smaller clusters is given by:
PD - [l - exp (- NRp2 Pd/c/R„2)] [l - exp (- B̂ / 2  a2)] (2-47)
where Pp/g Is taken from (2-4), is the pattern radius of a single 
small cluster, R ^  is the lethal radius of a single bomblet, and R^ 
is the radius of the overall munition pattern on the ground.
2 2 1/4Equation (2-46) Is maximized when CT ^
and (2-47) has a maximum given by (2-35),
pd .  [ i  - e*P (. Rp y  ® D/()/ y T o)] 2
2In terms of CEP (2-48) becomes
cep2 ... ri v  v 2 2
*1*2 [«" <X - / V ]
and (2-49) becomes
CEP2 n WCT PD/C Rp O'1 2
WC [«"(1 • / v]
For equal delivery accuracy and » K^K^n
hct pd/c r» 2 2 ri "-c “a 2 2








IR 2 P i l p D/d
WmC ! (0 < PD/C £ 11 (2 -50)
The smaller clusters are preferred if:
rln *Ul
D/C
< 1 ; (° < PD/C <; 1)
and conversely.
CHAPTER III
OPTIMUM DAMAGE PROBABILITY AGAINST AREA TARGETS
A. Singly Delivered Weapons Against an Area Target
1. The Probability of Fractional Coverage, Conditional Damage 
and Fractional Damage Functions for Area Weapons
a. The Conditional Damage Function
The conditional damage within the area of overlap between 
the target area and the pattern is identically the average probability 
of damage over the weapon pattern given in Equation (2-4) (Figure 3-1). 
It is repeated here for convenience.
V c  = [X ‘ eXP <’ V  “LB2711?2] (3_1>
b. The Fractional Coverage Functions
No single closed form approximation for the fractional 
coverage function could be found which yielded the desired accuracy 
over the entire R̂ ,/ct range (0 £ R^/ct £ 00). It was found that two 
expressions over appropriate intervals yielded acceptable accuracy 
over the applicable range of values.
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the coverage function
given in Equation (2-2) was accurate for all tactical surface targets
where R̂,/cr ̂  0.5 and (0 £ Rp/tf 5 w) •
For the range (0.5 < R̂ ,/ct < Rp/a) the coverage function is more 
accurately approximated by:




,/rrR̂  « Percentage of Target Area Covered
Figure 3-1
SINGLE AREA OR SINGLE UNITARY WEAPON COVER FUNCTION
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Over the interval (Rp/a £ £ »)» the coverage function is
approximated by:
FC “ c3 ~^2 [l " exp C4 (3-3)
A sequential unconstrained minimization technique employing a 
non-gradient parameter search was used to determine the values of 
the coefficients which minimized the error between the computed 
values of the coverage function and the numerically integrated values 
from reference 13. The initial error function utilized was:
where F„_ are the calculated values of the cover function and, F__ 
x i
are the numerically integrated values. The relative minimum program
searched for values which minimized this error function. The re­
sulting coefficients while producing extremely accurate results over 
ninty-five percent of the range, produced unacceptable deviations for
R-/o ps R /o-. This error function was discarded in favor of minimizing * P
the magnitude of the largest error, such that the maximum negative 
error matches the maximum positive error. For this fit the coefficients 
have the following values.
n
1 = 1
cx - 1.0 C2 - 0.41
c3 -  1.0 C4 - 0.436
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c. The Fractional Damage Functions
The fractional damage functions over the two Intervals 
are given by the products of Equation (3-1) and (3-2) or (3-3) re­
spectively.
Fd - [i - exp (- rjn R ^ 2/*,2] [l “ exP (“ -4l Rp2^ 2^] (3“4«)
r 2
FD " \} “ GXp rln RLB2/Rp2] “̂ 2 \} " exp ("*436 \ 2/A]
h
(3-4b)
2. The Probability of Fractional Coverage, Conditional
Damage and Fractional Damage Functions for Unitary Weapons 
The conditional damage for unitary warheads Is unity, 
a consequence of the manner in which the MAE is defined for any given 
damage or incapacitation criterion. The fractional damage is iden­
tically the fraction of the target covered.
FD “ L1 ~ 6XP *"‘41 (3-5a)
O 2
F„ - [l " exp (-.436 r//*2)] (3-5b)
®T
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3. Maximisation of the Damage Functions for Area Targets 
In a manner similar to the procedure in paragraph 
(II-A-4), the fractional damage functions may be maximized by deter­
mining the constrained optimum pattern radius. The fractional damage 
function
is maximized when
Fc a y a R„
PD/C aPD/C/aRp
a* Singly Delivered Area Weapons
On the interval (0.5 < R^/a < R la)* this expression
results in:
£l-exp(-.41Rp /CT )J .41 Rp £exp(-.41Rp /ff2)J
[l-eXp(-rinRj/Rp2)] r1nl^a2[exp(-rl.iRIj/Ri2)]
which is satisfied when
1/4
Rp ' <rlnRll °2/-4l> (3-6)
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the pattern radius which maximizes the fractional damage. However, 
on the Interval (Rp/cr £ ^ t̂ie result *-8:
R 2
^ 2  [l-e>'P(--'‘36RT2/a2)] R^expC-.MeRjV2)]
[l-exp(-r1„R1j/Rp2)] rjnR^^xpC-r^/Rp2)]
or
2 rin8il[exp<-rin^ i /Rp2>]
P [l-expC-r^Rj/Rp2)]
2 2substituting x = rin\g/Rp yields after simplification: 
x + 1 =» exp(x)
This expression Is satisfied only at x * 0 and x = oo. This Implies 
that at x = 0 , ^  = a corresponding to a minimum conditional damage 
(PD Ĉ = 0.0) and a maximum coverage probability (Fc = 1.0). Also 
implicit is at x = o , Rp = 0 corresponding to a maximum conditional 
damage (Pp^g = 1*0) and a minimum coverage probability (F̂  = 0 .0).
In both cases, r̂ , n and R ^  are positive real numbers, and the damage 
probability Is identically zero (P̂  = 0 .0).
The result is expected since by the imposed constraints (R̂  £ Rp), 
at Rp = oo , Rj, = oo. The two solutions form a coincident pair of 
global minima for the damage function, and being the only two solutions, 
existence of a maximum is precluded. Because of the constraints imposed
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as a consequence of the Interval being considered (Rp/o £ R^Vo & «) 
the optimum damage function la not obtainable Identically. That Is,
choice of pattern radius for any given munition/target/daraage criterion 
combination must be determined numerically by iterating the pattern 
radius and evaluating the damage function. An illustration of this 
problem is contained in Chapter 5.
This interval is academic insofar as conventional munitions 
design is concerned but is of considerable value for weapons effective­
ness assessments purposes. Although conventional munitions cannot be 
designed specifically for vast area targets (due to their low yield), 
it is often the case that the damage potential of multiple sortie or 
multiple mission strikes must be predicted. If Equation (3-6) is sub­
stituted into (3-4a) the following expression is obtained:
This is the maximum damage for the optimum pattern radius. Solving 
for the number of bomblets necessary to achieve a given fraction of 
damage for any specified target, damage criterion and aiming error, 
yields:
Fr) is non-existent. Therefore, the bestthe condition (F,
2
(3-7)
n - (l/.41r1)[(a/RLB) (1- ̂ ) ]  ; (0 < FD < 1) (3-8)
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4. Optimum Cluster Weapons versus Optimum Unitary Weapons
Equations (3-7) and (3-5a) are converted to terms of CEP
2and solved for CEP .
Equation (3-7) becomes:
2
CEP = — 7— ^-=2----- ! (0 < P„ < 1) (3-9),2 = -82 V \ B ** 2 
[to (i- / y ]
or, In terms of weapon weight,
2 .82 r.W_R.R (fa 2C E P ----- .A C XB . <Q < F 1} (3-10)
KiK2[to (i- /  y ]
Equation (3-5a) becomes:
CEP2 = _ -82 MAEJS.1 . (0 < F_ < 1) (3-11)
tt «« (1-Fd)
and in terms of weapon weight 
2 • 82 K W Bn 2
^  - - * to ( i-y ! ( 0 " F» < l) ( 3 - 1 2 )
Equating (3-10) and (3-12) and solving for
K.K2K (1" / V ]
Wp - - ■ , „ n'.r \ i (0 < Fn < 1) (3-13)2 {fa d-Fn) u » ^ D
1
which Is identically (2-26) for Fp = P̂ .
For equal system weights, this expression becomes:
k-k2k [*•(1" - / V ] 1^
W = -    ; (0 < F_ < 1) (3-14)
ri n \ B 0n d - V
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By comparing Equations (2-27) and (3-14), it can be concluded 
that target area does not Influence the choice of weapons systems 
for singly delivered weapons as long as the target consists of £ dis­
tributed simple multiple of a point target. The term simple multiple 
refers to an area containing a number of identical or equally vulner­
able point targets. An area containing a mixture of bare trucks and 
ordnance laden trucks as an example is excluded.
B. Multiply Delivered Weapons Against Area Targets
1. The Probability of Fractional Coverage, Conditional Damage and
was developed previously as reflected in Equation (2-29) and is re­
peated here for convenience.
b. The Fractional Coverage Function
Two different cases must be considered since the ratio 
or may differ significantly from the ratio R^A*. For R̂,/<t £ 0.5
and the interval (0 ^ R /̂a ^ ») the coverage function is given by:
Probability of Fractional Damage Functions for Area Weapons
a. The Conditional Damage Function
The conditional damage function for multiple area weapons
(3-15)
Fc ' -  [l-exp (-R w2/2 CT2) ] (3-16a)
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2 2and for the range (0.5 < R̂ /<y < R^ /2a ) it ia approximated by:
FC' " [ ^ P * - - 41 ^ 2/<?2>] (3-16b)
For theoretical completeness, the interval R^A7 £ R^A7 £ « 
must also be treated.
« 2
Fc' " ^  [l-exp(-.436 RT2/ff2)] (3-17)
Again, the interval upon which (3-17) is based is of no practical 
value in conventional weapons systems design, and is included only 
for theoretical completeness.
c. The Fractional Damage Functions
The probability of fractional damage is found by taking 
the products of Equations (3-15) and (3-16a), (3-16b) or (3-17) re­
spectively:
Fd' = [l-exp(-NRp2PD/c/Rw2)] [l-exp(-R^2 /2^2)J (3-18a)
Fjj' = [l-exp(-NRp2PD/(J/Rw2)] [l-exp(-.41Rw2/2CT2)] (3-18b)
. 2
Fjj' = [l-exp(-MRp2PD/c/^|2)] [l-exp(.436 Rj.2/*2)] (3-18c)
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2. The Probability of Fractional Coverage, Conditional Damage 
and Probability of Fractional Damage Functions for Unitary 
Weapons
a. The Conditional Damage Function
The conditional damage function for multiply delivered 
unitary weapons was developed earlier, in Equation (2-32), and is 
repeated here for convenience:
PD/o’ " [1'exp(-,nEL2/RM2)] (3'19)
b. The Fractional Coverage Functions
The fractional coverage functions for multiply delivered 
weapons with pattern radius are Identical to those for multiply 
delivered area weapons developed above. Equations (3-16a), (3-16b) 
and (3-17) are utilized over the appropriate intervals.
c. The Fractional Damage Functions
Taking the appropriate products, the fractional damage 
functions become:
Fd' = [l-exp(-mRL2/Rw2)] [l-exp(-Rw2 /2a2)] (3-20a)
Fjj' = [ l-ex p ^ m R ^ /R ^ )] [ l-e x p (- .4 1  h/ / 2^ ) ]  (3-20b)
j> 2
Fd ' ■= [l-exp(-n®^2/R^2) ]  [V ex p (-.4 3 6  Î .2/ct2) ]  (3-20c)
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3. Maximization of the Damage Function
It can be shown in the manner described in the previous 
chapter that the damage functions are approximated by:
fc
Vc' 3Vc/aRw
a. Multiply Delivered Area Munitions
Operation on Equations (3-15) and (3-16a) leads to Equa­
tions (3-15) and (3-16a) leads to:
^1-exp (-.41 R^/cr2)] .41 Rw^exp(-.41 R^/cj2)]
[l-exp(-NRp2Pj)/g/B^2)] NRp2PD/c a2[exp(-NRp2PD ĉ/RM2) J
This relation is satisfied when:
2 2
' %  -  ( m p \ / c  °  ' A l )  <3- 2 l>
the pattern radius which maximizes the fractional damage.
Substituting Equation (3-21) into (3-18b) the following expression 
results:
Fd' * 7  -41 NPD/C R p / c , ) ]  <3*22)




MULTIPLE AREA OR MULTIPLE UNITARY WEAPON COVER FUNCTION
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radius. The number of clusters required to achieve a specified frac­
tion of damage is given by:
N - (1/ .41 PD/C)[(a/Rp) Qn (1- / ^ ) ] 2 J (0 < < 1) (3-23)
b. Multiply Delivered Unitary Munitions
Operation on Equations (3-19) and (3-16a) leads to 
Equations (3-19) and (3-16b) leads to:
jVexp(-.41 R^/ct2)^ .41 Rw4j^exp(-.41 R^/ct̂ J
£l-exp( -mRĵ 2 /Rjj2 ) ] 2mRL2a2|̂ exp ( -mR^ / R ^  ) J
This relation is satisfied when:
2 2= (m^ c M D  (3-24)
This is the pattern radius which maximizes the fractional damage. 
The maximum fractional damage is obtained by substituting this ex­
pression into Equation (3-20b) yielding:
Fd - £l-exp(- J  Aim Fĵ /cOj2 (3-25)
The number of unitary weapons of lethal radius R^ required to 
achieve a specified fraction of damage against an area target of 




4. Optimum Cluster Weapons versus Optimum Unitary Weapons
Equations (3-22) and (3-25) are converted to terms of CEP and 
2solved for CEP . Equation (3-22) becomes:
2 .82 N Pjj/q R 071 2 i
CEP = — ---------? -.2- - i (0 < Fd < 1) (3-27)
[ ^( 1- yv>T
And in terms of weapon weight:
2
Bn *  . ,n . Vd2 ^CTPD/CRd ^  ̂  1C E P  ■Py.  P_,_ (o < F < 1} (3.28)
wc|> <l- / v T
Equation (3-25) becomes:
o • mR_ H/n 2 i
CEP =  -------,-- v i (0 < F < 1) (3-29)
[•. a-/V>]
And in terms of weapon weight:
2 . 8 2 W J L 2 ^ 2
CEP -    ; (0 < fd < 1) (3-30)
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This expression permits comparisons of the two weapons systems on 
an equal weight basis. The expression is Independent of the fractional 
damage, inferring that it holds for any specified level of damage, 
providing the respective systems being analyzed are capable of achieving 
the specified level of damage. As will be related in Chapter V, the 
weight requirements for high fractions of damage against area targets 
may be prohibitively large.
It is seen from Equation (3-31) that clusters are preferred if:
2 \
< l ; <o < pd/c s l)
and, unitary weapons are preferred if:
R ; <0 < P D/C<:1)
It is significant to note that Equation (3-31) is identically 
(2-44) and it can be concluded that target area does not Influence 
the choice of weapons systems for multiply delivered weapons.
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This conclusion, with the conclusion reached In the proceeding 
section on singly delivered weapons against area targets leads to the 
general conclusion that:
The choice of weapon system for any specified target Is Indepen­
dent of the size of the target as long as the target consists of a 
distributed simple multiple of a point target.
This conclusion has a far ranging impact on current weapon sys­
tem effectiveness analyses. Approximately 50-70 percent of all ana­
lysis efforts are devoted to analyzing the effects of target area 
(area targets consisting of uniformly distributed point targets) on 
weapon system preference. These studies have been shown to be redun­
dant. Elimination of these studies will eliminate a major workload 
In weapon system effectiveness analysis.
CHAPTER IV
OPTIMUM DAMAGE PROBABILITY AGAINST TARGETS 
WITH LOCATION UNCERTAINTY
Independent mathematical derivations involving a point target 
located at random within a specified area, where the actual location 
uncertainty has some probability distribution about the area cen­
troid, lead to mathematical relationships equivalent to those in 
Chapter 111.
The dynamic situation occurs when aircraft on search and destroy 
missions, acquire a mobile target at some fixed ground coordinate, 
but are not in position to deliver weapons against the target imme­
diately. During the relatively short time required for the aircraft 
to convert to an offensive strike attitude, the target has the latitude 
to maneuver or seek cover of the local terrain and vegetation. Al­
though the pilot may not reacquire the target specifically, due to 
possible masking which has occurred during the lapsed time interval, 
there is a realistic probability of damage associated with the de­
livery of weapons against the original acquisition coordinates pro­
viding the lapsed time increment is small compared to the target's 
evasive capability.
An analogous situation is a mobile target moving through a tree- 
line yielding fleeting positions to the attack aircraft. The motion 
and exact location are distorted, but a relative area of location 
is identifiable.
It became apparent early in the development of the mathematics 
of this chapter that this dynamic situation was equivalent to the
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static situation of the previous chapter. The conclusion reached 
is that:
The probability of damaging a point target within an area
of radius R̂ , where the location of the target is defined by standard
deviation cr̂ , the aircraft delivery error is defined by standard
deviation o-., and the total error am is a convolution of the two A’ T
former distrubutions, is identically the probability of fractional
damage against an area target of radius R̂  attacked with aiming error 
12crT- Bryant's work adequately treats this problem and is recommended 
to readers wishing to explore this subject further.
In the case of similar distributions in target location and aiming 
error, the variance of the total error distribution is the sum of the 
variances of the individual distributions. The mathematics of this 
section are in this respect redundant and are excluded. The results 
of analyses involving area targets are interpreted with regard to 
this analogy.
CHAPTER V
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN APPLICATIONS
A. Representative Systems and Targets
Representative weapons systems consisting of both area and unitary 
weapons were selected to demonstrate the applications of the mathe­
matical developments of Chapters II and III. The systems selected in­
clude an area weapon designed specifically as an anti-personnel wea­
pon, two area weapons designed for anti-material applications, two 
general purpose area weapons and four general purpose high-explosive/ 
blast/fragmentation unitary weapons.
These weapons where applicable, were analyzed in seven employment 
situations against three targets selected for their size and varying 
degrees of difficulty. The employment situation consisted of singly 
delivered weapons, four, six and twelve weapons delivered in pairs, 
and four, six and twelve weapons delivered in salvo. Both the weapons 
systems and the targets considered are briefly described below. Data 
generated for these systems utilizing the closed form approximations 
were accurate to the second decimal when compared to the numerically 
integrated results.
1. Systems Considered in the Analysis
a. Weapon system number one (1) is an anti-personnel/ma­
teriel cluster (area weapon) containing 670, one pound bomblets.
The total system weight is 830 pounds.
b. Weapon system number two (2) is an anti-materiel cluster 




c. Weapon system number three (3) Is an antipersonnel/ 
material cluster containing 665, one pound booblets. The total 
system weight Is 867 pounds.
d. Weapon system number four (A) Is an antipersonnel 
dispenser/cluster containing 2030, one-quarter pound bomblets. The 
total system weight Is 888 pounds.
e. Weapon system number five (5) Is an antlmaterlal dis­
penser containing 40, 13.2 pound bomblets. The total system weight 
Is 708 pounds.
f. Weapon system number six (6) Is a 250 pound class general 
purpose unitary weapon.
g. Weapon system number seven (7) Is a 500 pound class 
general purpose unitary weapon.
h. Weapon system number eight (8) Is a 1000 pound class 
general purpose unitary weapon.
1. Weapon system number nine (9) Is a 2000 pound class 
general purpose unitary weapon.
2. Targets Considered in the Analysis
2a. Target one (1) is a small area (3000 ft ) of prone per­
sonnel. It Is classed as a point target.
b. Target two (2) is a 2 1/2 ton truck, bare, but with gas 
tanks partially filled.
2c. Target three (3) is an area (563,000 ft ) consisting 
of uniformly distributed point targets of the class described in (b) 
above.
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Table 5-1 Is a summary of the weapon/target combinations 
selected for a representative analysis. The summary contains the 
physical properties of the weapons systems and their associated 
lethality for each applicable target. Table 5-2 is a summary of 
Chapters XI and III. Applicable constants are related for all 9 
weapon system considered.
Weapon system group 1 consists of weapons 6-9 as a family of 
general purpose unitary weapons. This terminology will be referred 
to quite frequently throughout this chapter.
Table 5-3 relates a typical comparison of the numerically inte­
grated results obtained from The Analysis Division, Air Force Armament 
Laboratory to solutions generated at Louisiana State University using 
the close form approximations. Systems shown have annular patterns 
and the damage reflected is for single weapon delivery.
TABLE 5-1





















MAE ( f O
1 670 0.93 830 195 257 25 25
2 217 2.20 672 195 409 190 190
3 665 1.01 867 195 387 95 95
4 40 13.2 708 157 N/A 870 870
5 2030 0.276 888 176 288 N/A N/A
6 Unitary 260 260- N/A 7,700 6,000 6,000
7 Unitary 531 531 N/A 11,800 10,000 10,000
8 Unitary 985 985 N/A 21,200 15,700 15,700




System K a Kĵ K2
Tgt 1 Tgt2 Tgt3 Tgtl Tgt2 Tgt3
1 N/A N/A .765 .95
2 N/A N/A .710 2.20
3 N/A N/A .775 1.01
4 N/A N/A .801 .276
5 N/A N/A .780 13.2
9 266.2 114.1 114.1 .6056 .7127 .7127 N/A N/A
TABLE 5-3





Delivery Error fo - mils)
40 20 10 6
N C N C N C N C
Damage Probability <v
1 1 .11 .110 .28 .282 .28 .279 .10 .098
2 1 .19 .197 .50 .501 .50 .497 .17 .175
4 1 .06 .061 .19 .192 .33 .326 .21 .206
1 2 .01 .015 .04 .037 .04 .037 .01 .013
2 2 .03 .034 .11 .107 .18 .181 .11 .114
3 2 .05 .050 .13 .128 .13 .127 .04 .045
■ i
N denotes numerically integrated results 
C denotes closed form results
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B. Point Target Analyses
1. Area Weapons Analysis
Composite plots of damage probability versus delivery error 
have been prepared for currently existing annular patterns, theoretical 
continuous non-optimum patterns and theoretical optimum patterns. Con­
tinuous non-optimum patterns are defined as patterns having the same 
radius as the outer radius of existing annular patterns but with the 
submunitions distributed randomly over the entire pattern as opposed 
to being distributed over an annular ring. Since optimum pattern 
radii are explicit functions of delivery error optimum continuous 
patterns infer that the radii must be controlled if the damage pro­
bability is to be maximized for any given delivery error.
Contrary to prevailing opinion that eliminating existing annular 
patterns through redesign of current cluster munitions will increase 
the damage probability of these systems, it is obvious from Figures 
5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-9, 5-10 and 5-11 that any modification will result 
in an inconsquential increase in damage probability over the range 
of current combat delivery errors. However, the potential of current 
systems with improved delivery accuracy actually decreases for point 
target applications since improved accuracy places the relatively 
large central void of the annular pattern over the target. Consider­
able improvement in damage potential is possible through elimination 
of the annular patterns if the redesign is accompanied by substantial 
decrease in delivery error.
The advent of substantial Improvements in delivery accuracy 
necessitates a new design discipline in cluster submunitions. Fig­
ure 5-4 relates the optimum pattern radius versus delivery error for
73
these representative systems. It is clear from this figure that 
simple in design, inexpensive, ballistlcally dispersed submunitions 
are contenders as replacements for current self-dispersing auto- 
rotating magnus bomblets. The current systems cannot achieve patterns 
this small and maintain an acceptable reliability. As a matter of 
fact, the annular patterns contained in these analyses have the 
smallest radii achievable for current systems.
The pattern size of ballistlcally dispersed submunitions can be 
controlled through control of cluster function altitude or slant 
range. It must be reiterated that the ballistlcally dispersed sub­
munitions are contenders only over the improved delivery accuracy 
range (CT £ 150 feet) since pattern radii outside this range will 
be difficult to achieve by this method of dispersion.
2. Unitary Weapons Analysis
As related in Chapter 2, unitary weapons patterns (lethal 
areas) are not subject to maximization procedures from an employment 
standpoint, their lethal radii are functions only of their weight 
and physical design, primarily the charge mass to metal mass ratio 
and properties of the case metal. Damage probability can be assessed 
and is related in Figures 5-8 and 5-15.
3. Cluster Weapons versus Unitary Weapons
There is a continuing controversy over the design and employ­
ment of cluster and unitary weapons. The controversy arises over de­
sign priority, range of applicability, and flexibility of employment. 
Unitary weapons possess a high blast capability and with such offer 
a much larger range of employment (greater range of targets).
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Figures 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-13 and 5-14 related weapon preference 
2in terms of CEP and weapon weight. It is obvious from these figures 
that cluster munitions compensate for large delivery errors to some 
extent and are preferred over unitary weapons on a weight basis over 
a large range of delivery error. This range extends to relatively 
small delivery errors commensurate with what is probably the best 
achievable accuracy for unguided aircraft delivered munitions over 
the next two decades. However, it is again obvious that unitary 
weapons offer the greatest potential for guided weapons applications.
In addition to the above planning and selection criteria, the 
methodology and specifically this type of graphic presentation offers 
a rapid and accessible technique for the following type of employment 
questions:
a. Given any delivery error and weapon weight:
What type of weapon system is preferred? What is 
the expected target damage?
b. Given any delivery error and desired level of damage: 
What type of weapon system is preferred?
What weapon weight is required?
c. Given a fixed weapon weight allowable and a desired 
level of damage:
What accuracy is required?
Hence, can the weapons be delivered from aircraft in a freefall 
mode or must they be guided?
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4. Weapon Design Characteristics and Employment Parametric
The design characteristics of cluster munitions, specifically 
weight, volume and external configuration can be explicitly defined 
in terms of the number of submunltlons to be contained. The methodology 
of Chapter 2 permits the determination of the number of bomblets re­
quired for any specified level of damage and delivery error. Figure 
5-16 relates this information specifically for the submunitions con­
tained in weapon 3 when employed against target 2 .
Figure 5-17 relates the number of clusters required to achieve 
any desired level of damage as a function of delivery error. The 
information displayed pertains to the employment of weapon 3 against 
target 2. Figure 5-18 relates the same type of information which re­
gards to the anployment of weapon 7 against target 2. These two fig­
ures relate the inability of these systems to achieve a high degree 
of damage with current delivery errors without the expenditure of 
extremely large numbers of munitions. The number of aircraft re­
quired is implicit in the number of munitions required and can be 
determined simply by ratioing the number of munitions required to 
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5. Multiple Weapons Employment
Current lntervalometers are designed specifically for 
'stick bombing1, that Is, for releasing unitary weapons at specified 
Intervals over a short segment of the flight path. Several options 
are available depending upon the aircraft being employed. In gen­
eral, all aircraft have at least three interval options available, 
those being 0.06, 0.10 or 0.15 seconds.
Optimum weapons sequencing is as Important as optimum release 
Interval. However, In many cases optimum weapons sequence in terms 
of obtaining the most advantangeous weapons pattern conflicts with 
the sequence necessary to maintain the weight balance and aero­
dynamic symmetry of the delivery aircraft. Good sequencing then,
Is an orderly release of external stores with generates the best 
possible weapons pattern constrained by the maximum acceptable 
weight unbalance and aerodynamic assymmetry.
Other options which are available besides interval and sequence, 
are the numbers of weapons released at each time interval. Some 
of the more common options include: single weapons, weapons in 
pairs, weapons in salvo, ripple single weapons and ripple pairs of 
weapons. Single weapon selection permits the pilot to release onei
weapon each time the release switch is depressed, pair selection 
infers the same for dual weapons release and the salvo mode clears 
the entire weapons complement with a single depression of the re­
lease switch. Ripple single weapons is a mode which exhausts the 
weapons in a string, one weapon at each time interval, the string 
length depending upon the intervalometer setting selected. Ripple 
pairs permits pairs of weapons to be released in a string.
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a. Multiple Unitary Weapons
The interval o£ the weapons, denoted in Figure 5-19 
as 'current pattern', is 0.10 seconds. As can be observed, the 
damage probability obtained through optimum patterns does not differ 
greatly from the selected standard Interval, especially in the low 
delivery error range. These differences would have been signifi­
cantly less had the 'current pattern' been made consistent with the 
magnitude of the delivery error. That is, had the damage at large 
delivery errors been assessed with 0.15 second intervals and low 
delivery errors with 0.06 second intervals, the differences would 
have been minor. This is verified in Figure 5-21 which demonstrates 
that large patterns are desired when large delivery errors are 
expected.
Optimum pattern size is highly dependent upon the number of 
weapons in the pattern as is shown in Figures 5-21, 5-23 and 5-25 
for four, six and twelve unitary weapons released in pairs re­
spectively. The composite plot in Figure 5-26 is indicative of 
the variation in desired pattern size with number of weapons con­
tained in the pattern. The variation in expected damage as a func­
tion of the number of weapons in the pattern is amply demonstrated 
in Figures 5-20a, 5-22 and 5-24.
Multiple weapons released in a salvo generate patterns nearer 
the optimum than multiple pair releases. Figure 5-20b is illustra­
tive of the damage achievable through this mode of release. Com­
parison of these results with the pairwise release in Figure 5-20a 
and the optimum pattern damage related in Figure 5-19 demonstrates
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b. Multiple Cluster Weapons
The effect of the central voids of existing annular 
patterns is lessened when cluster weapons are employed in multiples. 
This can be observed in Figures 5-27 through 5-32. For 12 weapons 
delivered in pairs, as reflected in Figures 5-31 and 5-32, the effect 
is insignificant. The overlapping annular rings essentially cover 
the central voids.
The potential increase in damage probability for weapons de­
signed and employed with continuous optimum patterns is not lessened. 
On the contrary, it is amplified as shown in Figures 5-27 through 
5-32. The optimum pattern sizes commensurate with the maximized 
damage probability are contained in Figures 5-33 and 5-34. The 
optimum pattern radii for clusters is somewhat larger than those 
for unitary weapons, the basic difference being in the differences 
in cluster pattern radii and the smaller lethal radii of unitary 
weapons, not in the lntervalometer and sequencing requirements.
The lntervalometer and sequencing requirements are not substantially 
different. The composite plot of cluster and unitary radii in 
Figure 5-35 is indicative of the small variations, especially over 
the range of low delivery error.
Weapon preference is exemplified in Figure 5-36. The trends 
reflected in this figure are consistent with the preference trends 
in single weapons employment, wherein the lower weight unitary wea­
pons presented a greater challenge to cluster weapons.
The flattening trend in the damage curve of the continuous 
non-optimum patterns results from the fact that the coverage func­
tion becomes nearly unity at modestly large values of delivery
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error and since the pattern radii in these patterns are fixed at 
the outer radii of current annular patterns, the conditional damage 
function is a constant. Only in the continuous optimum patterns 
is the damage function permitted to vary and that due to the varia­
tion in the optimum pattern with delivery error.
Similarly, since the annular pattern damage is related to the 
difference in the probability that the target lies in an area de­
fined by the outer radius and the probability that it lies in an 
area defined by the inner radius, the decrease in damage probability 
is accounted for by the fact that as the delivery error becomes 
small, the probability that the target lies within the inner area 
approaches the probability that it lies in the total area. Again, 
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C. Area Target Analyses
The methodology for analyzing area targets whose areas are less 
than the munitions patterns differs from the point target analysis 
only by a set of constant parameters*and such being the case, a 
lengthy comparative analysis of this application would be redundant 
and is omitted.
Target 3 is a large area target whose total area (250 meters 
X 250 meters) is larger than the largest available pattern sizes 
of extant conventional munitions. Thus the applicable interval 
is (Rp/o £ Rrp/cr £ «)•
Figures 5-37, 5-38 and 5-39 are illustrative of the degree of 
damage possible with large area munitions, designed specifically to 
produce widespread damage on area targets. Alternatively, it is 
often stated that large area munitions are designed to compensate 
for large delivery areas. Whatever the case may be, comparison 
of these results with the fractional damage generated by employment 
of equal numbers of unitary weapons, demonstrates the overwhelming 
preference of area munitions for this class of area target applica­
tion. It must be emphasized that this target is susceptible to frag­
mentation and as such is the primary reason for the area weapon pre­
ference. The area weapon ^cluster and dispenser munitions) would 
produce little or no damage on large industrial complexes and the 
preference trends would be reversed.
The fractional damage in Figures 5-37 and 5-41 results from 
employing the respective munitions with existing weapons patterns, 
that is, from weapons patterns generated by current intervalometers 
and release sequence. The effect of pattern radius on fractional
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damage is illustrated in Figures 5-42, 5-43 and 5-44. The first 
two relate the damage produced by unitary weapons of varying yield 
for 4 and 12 weapons released in pairs respectively. It is signifi­
cant to note that the lower yield weapons reach near maximum damage 
potential at weapon pattern radii less than the target radius 
(Rp < Rj,) although the true maximum has not been reached. The 
higher yield weapons demonstrate a higher potential for larger 
pattern radii, implying patterns larger than the target area would 
have been beneficial if achievable. Similar trends can be observed 
from Figure 5-44 pertaining to cluster weapons. Here however, it 
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It must be emphasized that the mathematical developments 
contained in this report were developed primarily as a means for 
rapid but acceptably accurate weapons systems effectiveness assess­
ments, definition of preliminary weapons design characteristics 
and as a weapons development planning and programming tool. As such, 
perturbations induced by ejection angles and variations in ejection 
velocities and other aircraft Interface perturbations are not con­
sidered. The methodology therefore permits the assessment of the 
effect of these perturbations through the comparison of ideal release 
conditions to actual release conditions made possible by comparing 
the results of this method with the numerically integrated results. 
Such comparisons can lead to preliminary design constraints or de­
sired design characteristics for interface hardware.
The most basic problem confronting the efficient employment of 
conventional munitions today is the prevailing tendency to design 
and fly airframes with little regard to the external payload, 
other than such considerations as 'lotal payload weight, load factor 
design and hard point allocation and location. As a consequence, 
the munitions are an after-the-fact consideration, their carriage 
and release suffering surverely from the secondary role relegated 
to them during airframe concept formulation and design.
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It Is possible, with proper design, to achieve higher damage 
probabilities with substantially decreased payloads. This not only 
decreases costs, but relieved payload requirements can be traded 
off for Increased range, endurance, acceleration, velocity, climb, 
or other airframe performance characteristics. In addition, if 
proper design discipline is followed, the total weight of the air­
frame can be reduced, reducing aircraft costs or increasing the 
number of aircraft available for a fixed cost.
In terms of combat effectiveness, it is axiomatic that if the 
number of munitions required to destroy a traget is reduced, sortie 
rate is reduced and stockpile requirements are eased. Many other 
tangible and intangible benefits are derived from the "domino" 
effect caused by a reduction in the number of weapons expended per 
target.
The effects of improper munitions carriage and release barely 
manifest themselves when current JMEM^ combat accuracies are con­
sidered. The capabilities commensurate with these inaccuracies are 
so obscure (the errors are so large) that carriage and release and 
ballistic dispersion errors are negligible.
The advent of improved delivery accuracy with regard to current 
estimates of achlevability, places both the carriage and release 
and ballistic errors on an equal basis with delivery errors. As 
delivery accuracy is improved, greater emphasis must be placed on 
the quality control of mass production of munitions and on proper 




a. It has been shown that In the Inqproved delivery accuracy 
range, continuation of current design trends will result In sub- 
optimal systems. This is especially true for the delivery of cluster 
and dispenser munitions and for multiply delivered unitary weapons.
b. Current intervalometers and sequence become obsolete 
In the improved delivery accuracy range. Current multiple ejec­
tion racks (MERS) and triple ejector racks (TERS) with their ad­
verse ejection characteristics will degrade the effectiveness of 
future weapons systems.
c. There appears to be almost total arbitrariness in the 
selection of functioning altitudes for cluster munitions. In 
addition to sub-optimal spacing in multiple cluster patterns through 
improper sequencing, the individual cluster patterns which result from 
arbitrary function altitudes yield substantially inferior damage 
probabilities to that achievable with proper regard to optimum 
capabilities. A high degree of inferiority is prevalent when de­
livery error is reduced.
d. Target area need not be a parameter in weapon systems 
preference studies when the area consists of distributed point tar­
gets of equal or nearly equal susceptibility to the weapon system 
being evaluated.
e. The approximations developed during this investigation 
have been shown to be of immense value in reducing the weapon 
systems analysis to a fraction of that currently required. This is 
achieved by subjecting the weapon system candidates to swift and
relatively accurate preliminary analysis and eliminating the ob­
viously undesirable weapons systems early and with little effort, 
thereby permitting increased attention to evaluation of the more 
promising systems or reassignment of large portions of existing 
analytical manpower and computer resources.
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B. Recommendations
1. Large amounts of resources are devoted to airframe and 
weapon system development without proper emphasis on the interface 
between airframe and ordnance. Detailed tradeoff studies should be 
made on the cost and effect of improved ejection and optimum 
sequencing of external and internal stores.
2. Consideration should be given to the development of variable 
function altitude fuzing and to the advisability of placing the 
choice of function altitude with the pilot or with a weapons fuzing 
and release computer. This would permit the pilot to select an 
optimum pattern radius commensurate with the type and size of target 
encountered. For preplanned missions, where these target character­
istics are known, the proper settings could be made by the ground 
crew prior to mission initiation. This however, still leaves the 
pilot with the task of achieving a preplanned release point in 
multi-dimensional velocity-attitude-space for the optimum to be 
achieved. For search and destroy missions, armed escort and enhance­
ment of the preplanned missions, consideration should be given
to the former.
3. Consideration should be given to the design and development 
of inexpensive ballistically dispersed submunitions which generate a 
continuous distribution of munitions over the pattern and pattern 
size control commensurate with the above. Ballistically dispersed 
submunitions will permit greater flexibility in the optimum lethal 
design characteristics. Current spherical shapes yield the poorest 
lethal effects per unit weight of any possible geometric shape,
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The coverage function for annular patterns may be determined 
by considering the coverage probabilities of the associated outer 
(R̂ ) and inner (R̂ ) radii. The probability that the target lies 
within the area generated by Rq is:
PCo = [l.-exp(-R02/2cr2)] (A-l)
and the probability that it lies within the area generated by the 
R^ is:
PCi - [l.-expC-R^/V*)] (A-2)
Finally, the probability that the target lies in the annular ring
is the difference in (A-l) and (A-2);
Pc = [exp(-Ri2/2a2) - exp(-^2/2a2)] (A-3)
The conditional damage function must also be modified since 






and the conditional damage function la given by:
PD/C “ [1-exP ^ rlnRLB2/(Ro2_Ri2) >] (A'4)
and finally, the damage probability 18 given by:
PD = [exp(-Ri2/2a2)-exp(-Ro2/2cr2)J x
[l-exp(r1nRLB2/(Ro2 -Rl2))] (A.5)
For multiple weapon8 employment, the area of the re8ultlng 
central void muat be determined and the coverage function modified
In a manner almllar to the above. The conditional damage function
2 2 2 la found aimply by replacing R^ in Equation (2-29) with (Rq - R^ )
2and making the appropriate 8ub8tltution8 for R^ .
PD/C' - {l- H > < R0 2-Rl2> PD/C/BW*2] }
where R* la a function of the difference between the overall pattern 
area and the reaulting central void if it exi8ta.
Appropriate combinationa of the above equatlona will yield 
the damage equatlona for area targeta as demon8trated In Chapter 3.
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